An Israeli Air Force plane at an undisclosed location in Israel on Oct 26, 2024. Four soldiers were killed in Israel's attack that targeted air defence systems and missile production sites on the outskirts of Tehran and in western Iran. (Photo: Israel Defense Forces/Handout via Reuters)

Commentary: Israel’s carefully calibrated strike on Iran lowers risk of all-out war – for now

By avoiding escalatory attacks, Iran would ensure that the international community remains focused on the wars in Gaza and Lebanon at a time when Israel’s support network is fracturing, says RSIS’ Dr James M Dorsey.

by · CNA · Join

SINGAPORE: This weekend’s carefully calibrated Israeli retaliatory strike at Iranian military targets could lower the risk of an all-out Middle East war - for now - particularly if Iran decides not to respond.

The Iranian military said as much by suggesting in a statement that Iran reserved the right to defend itself but may not respond to the attack if Israel agreed to ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.

The military said four soldiers were killed in the attack that targeted air defence systems and missile production sites on the outskirts of Tehran and in western Iran. It was unclear how much damage Israel inflicted.

Similarly, Israel privately advised Iran in advance of what its attack would target and suggested the attack would end the Iranian-Israeli tit-for-tat if Iran did not respond.

By avoiding escalatory tit-for-tat attacks, Iran would ensure that the international community remains focused on the wars in Gaza and Lebanon at a time when Israel’s support network is fracturing.

With Israeli-Iranian tensions constrained, the fractures in Israel’s US and European diplomatic and military defence shield and the Jewish state’s existing and potential regional partnerships are likely to return to the forefront, potentially with a vengeance.

A general view of Tehran after several explosions were heard in Tehran on Oct 26, 2024. (Photo: AFP/Atta Kenare)

ISRAEL’S MEASURED RESPONSE PROOF OF US INFLUENCE

Unwittingly, the Israeli-Iranian tit-for-tat illustrated that the United States has the leverage to impose its will on Israel when it wants to.

The US insisted in recent weeks that Israel’s response to Iran’s Oct 1 barrage of almost 200 missiles fired at Tel Aviv should target Iranian military facilities rather than nuclear or oil-related installations.

The demonstration of US power will increase pressure on the Biden administration, particularly after the upcoming US presidential election on Nov 5, to push Israel to agree to ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon and speed up the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

The administration earlier this month opened the door to a more critical approach towards Israel when US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken gave Israel 30 days to boost humanitarian aid access in Gaza or risk having some US military assistance cut off.

Mr Austin and Mr Blinken’s ultimatum constituted the first time since the Gaza war erupted a year ago that the US publicly threatened to sanction Israel if it failed to live up to its international obligations and comply with US law.

The 30-day deadline falls after the US election, when electoral politics no longer inhibit the outgoing administration that will have a relatively free hand until the next president takes office on Jan 20 next year.

FRACTURES IN ISRAEL’S DIPLOMATIC TIES

An ebbing of fears of an Israeli-Iranian all-out war that could make it difficult for the US and regional players to remain aloof would fortify European pressure on the US to force Israel to agree to ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.

Various European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and Belgian Development Minister Caroline Gennez, have called for an arms embargo, while Spain and Italy have suspended new post-Oct 7 arms sales to Israel.

Last month, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that Britain had suspended 30 of 350 arms export licences to Israel after it found a "clear risk certain military exports to Israel might be used in violations of International Humanitarian Law". Britain also recently sanctioned seven Israeli groups it said were connected to illegal settlement construction in the West Bank.

Earlier this year, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia recognised Palestine as a state, bringing the number of European Union members who have accepted Palestinian statehood to 11. They were joined by Norway, one of five non-EU European states that also recognised Palestine.

In a further indication of the fracturing of Israel’s formal and informal support network, Gulf states were quick to condemn Israel’s retaliatory strike at Iran.

In a sign of the times, Saudi Arabia and Iran this month held joint naval exercises in the Sea of Oman to build confidence between the archrivals as they sought to ensure that the Gulf states would not be sucked into a possible all-out Middle East war.

The exercises suggested that Gulf states could reconsider their assessment of Israel’s value as a regional security partner.

Driving the reconsideration and fracturing is Israel’s war conduct, including its disproportionate bombings of Gaza and Lebanon; its weaponisation of food, medicine, and other humanitarian aid; its refusal to agree to a Gaza ceasefire, and its inability to achieve declared war goals, including the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah.

ISRAEL’S GEOPOLITICAL UTILITY

“As the war drags on, the question … ‘Is Israel still a vital US interest?’ becomes increasingly relevant. The failure to decisively defeat Hamas and the growing risks of a regional war involving Iran may force US and European policymakers to reconsider the costs associated with unwavering support for Israel,” Ali Shehab, a Saudi analyst who is believed to be close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, wrote recently in a column.

Mr Shehab suggested that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could also reconsider Israel’s geopolitical utility.

Mr Shehab recited Hezbollah’s resilience in the face of serious body blows Israel inflicted on the group and Hezbollah’s successful exploitation of “gaps in Israeli intelligence and defences”, as well as an apparent cyberattack that degraded Israel’s anti-missile defence system in advance of Iran’s Oct 1 missile barrage that targeted Tel Aviv.

Echoing the Saudi crown prince’s insistence that the kingdom will not recognise Israel without the creation of an independent Palestinian state, Mr Shehab warned that mounting pro-Palestinian sentiment could force Gulf rulers to further distance themselves from Israel.

“Recent media portrayals of Israeli military setbacks at the hands of Hezbollah hint at the reality that public opinion in the Gulf remains opposed to unconditional support for Israel. This … becomes even more pronounced when Israel engages in aggressive military actions that provoke backlash across the Arab world,” Mr Shehab noted. “Gulf states may find themselves having to reassess their diplomatic positioning.”

Dr James M Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M Dorsey.

Source: CNA/aj

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